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In 1975, in an old abbey in Royaumont, France, Massimo Piattelli-Palmarini 
gathered linguists, philosophers, psychologists and computationalists for the first 
biolinguistics get-together to discuss what the linguistics of the period told us 
about the structure of the mind/brain. The participants defended two contrasting 
viewpoints. One group, centered on Piaget’s work, claimed that language 
mastery supervened on very general laws of cognitive development, language 
acquisition and use reflecting mental powers continuous with those witnessed in 
other areas of cognition. A second cohort, with Chomsky’s work as cynosure, 
countered that the specificity of linguistic competence argued against any general 
psychological processes that encompassed both linguistic knowledge and other 
forms of cognition. It is fair to say that Chomsky’s side got the better of the argu-
ment. The main problem for the Piagetians was explaining in non-metaphoric 
detail how their proposed general cognitive and developmental mechanisms 
could result in the particular kinds of phenomena linguists had discovered (e.g., 
how does the structure dependence of grammatical operations follow from 
Piaget’s constructivism?). Chomsky’s challenge was simple: Deduce the “laws” 
of grammar from the more general laws of psychology/development, or concede 
that the mind/brain contains very specific linguistically dedicated mental struc-
tures that guide the emergence of linguistic competence and performance. 
 The Royaumont volume (Piattelli-Palmarini 1980) serves as an interesting 
backdrop to the one under review here. Once again, Massimo Piattelli-Palmarini 
serves as impresario (this time in concert with Juan Uriagereka and Pello 
Salaburu) and convenes a group of distinguished linguists, psychologists, bio-
logists, and neuroscientists in a very scenic spot (San Sebastian in Spain’s Basque 
Country) to discuss what current linguistic theory suggests about the structure of 
the mind/brain. This time round, however, the relevant linguistic perspective is 
the one offered by the Minimalist Program (Chomsky 1995 et seq.). Consequently, 
much of the discussion aims to minimize the degree to which language mastery 
requires specifically linguistic mental powers and emphasizes the continuation 
between linguistic competence and other cognitive capacities.  
 It is tempting to conclude from this that, although the Piagetians lost the 
earlier battle, they decisively won the peace by converting their antagonists. 
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Tempting but inaccurate. At Royaumont, Chomsky & Co. had no principled ob-
jections to Piaget’s conclusions. Rather they argued that the Piagetian claim was 
too thin to be of interest for it failed to show how the postulated general cognitive 
principles could explain the specific properties of the faculty of language.1 It is 
this rather large hole that the Minimalist Program aspires to plug, and unless it 
does so, minimalist aspirations will prove to be no hardier than the Piagetian 
ones that Chomsky & Co. so successfully routed at Royaumont. In what follows, 
we discuss both how to specify the gap that needs filling and how minimalism is 
going about filling it. 
 Like the earlier Royaumont volume, the papers here are uniformly 
thoughtful and provide an excellent guide to some of the best thinking on 
biolinguistic themes. The discussion sections at the end of each paper are 
particularly intriguing (and invariably amusing). They give the reader the feel of 
being part of the festivities. It is clear that the participants had a really good time 
and this makes for a very good read. We recommend that your reading be 
accompanied by snacks — preferably tapas and a good wine (a nice Rioja would 
suit) — to help recreate the atmosphere. In what follows we will touch on some 
of the themes discussed. However, a magisterial review of all the papers herein is 
beyond our abilities. As excuse, we borrow Chomsky’s (p. 379): 
 
I’ve tried to think a little about how to organize some comments. An awful 
lot of fascinating material has been presented here, some of which I under-
stood, some of which I didn’t. What I’ll try to do is pick out some points that 
come to mind […] expressing an apology in advance to everyone whose 
work I misrepresent.2 
 
1. The Minimalist Program 
 
The volume begins and ends with some useful history (Noam Chomsky’s Open-
ing Remarks in chapter 2 and Conclusion in chapter 23), part of which rationally 
reconstructs the generative enterprise. The generative enterprise has its origins in 
a 17th century question: In what way is language a window on the mind? By 
giving the question some contour, we can generate a modern research program 
as follows: (i) Specify the properties of human natural languages, (ii) figure out 
what kind of mind/brain could assimilate and manipulate objects with these 
properties, and (iii) determine which mind/brain properties are proprietary to 
dealing with objects like these and which are features of a more generally 
competent cognitive device. (i)–(iii) correspond to the three principle epochs in 
generative research: the early years, which investigated the kinds of rules and 
constructions characteristic of natural languages (recursive, structure-dependent, 
with both local and non-local dependencies); the middle years, when these rule 
systems were simplified by factoring out their general properties (A/A’-move-
                                                
    1 The same holds for claims reducing linguistic knowledge to a species of “general intelli-
gence”. It is not so much that these positions are wrong as they are of dubious utility if one’s 
aim is to understand the attested structure of cognitive capacities. For some relevant discus-
sion of these themes, see Rochel Gelman’s discussion of core domains versus HoWs (hell-
on-wheels) in chapter 15. 
    2 Our addition: And those that we ignore or only briefly mention. 
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ment dependencies, local and non-local construal systems, domains of opacity for 
movement and construal like islands and binding domains, core notions like c-
command, abstract licensing conditions such as case and ECP); and finally the 
current minimalist project, which tries to segregate the general properties (e.g., 
identified by Principles-and-Parameters theories like Government-and-Binding 
Theory) into those requiring specifically linguistic principles and operations and 
those reflecting general aspects of cognition/computation.  
 Chomsky’s remarks sketch how the current concerns of the minimalist 
program “arose in a natural way from the successes of the P&P approach”. They 
did so in two ways. First, the results of P&P theories allowed “the basic contours 
of an answer to the problem of explanatory adequacy” to come, at least faintly, 
into view and thus allowed research to “turn more seriously to the ‘why’ 
questions that transcend explanatory adequacy”. Second, Chomsky remarks that 
P&P theories removed “the major conceptual barrier to the study of the evolution 
of language […]. [By] divorc[ing] the principles of language from acquisition, it 
no longer follows that the format that “limits admissible hypotheses” must be 
rich and highly structured to satisfy the empirical conditions of language acqui-
sition, in which case inquiry into evolution would be virtually hopeless ” (p. 25).  
 For those who found these last remarks as cryptic as we did, here is what 
Chomsky meant.3 Pre-P&P syntactic theory consists of a “format for rule systems 
and an evaluation metric (EM) to rank them”. This EM is “language internal”, not 
a domain independent “general simplicity measure”.4 EM seeks to specify “what 
[…] a legitimate generalization in language” is. This account permits a possible 
theory of language acquisition — “run through all possible grammars from the 
shortest on and stop when you have one conforming to PLD [primary linguistic 
data — NH & AD]. But that’s unfeasible […]. So it’s not really a theory”. The P&P 
theory is feasible as it requires “answering a finite questionnaire”. Pre-P&P theo-
ries, in contrast, require the language acquisition device to make global decisions 
about the structure and format of entire grammars, and this, though logically 
coherent, is computationally unfeasible as it involves powers beyond what it is 
reasonable to suppose that children (or adults) have. Thus, the intractability of 
EM and its linguistic specificity made evolutionary considerations quite hopeless. 
Put positively, P&P’s distillation of a set of general and useable generalizations 
(“laws of grammar”) makes it possible to address the question of the etiology of 
these generalizations.  
 A quick digression: The idea that P&P theories should be computationally 
tractable because acquisition involves “answering a finite questionnaire” (i.e. 
setting a finite number of parameters) has proven to be very difficult to demon-
strate. Janet Fodor (chapter 17) reviews the issues and explains why the problem 
has proven so refractory. The main difficulty is that the parameter values are not 
independent, their correct values often depending on the values of other para-
meters. This makes it very hard to set them correctly one at a time and this makes 
                                                
    3 Thanks to Noam Chomsky (p.c.) for clarifying discussion. Quotes are from correspondence 
with Chomsky. See also Fodor’s paper in chapter 17, where she outlines and evaluates the 
Aspects theory (Chomsky 1965). 
    4 It is unlikely that non-trivial versions of this kind of simplicity measure exist. At least no 
successful one has been proposed to date. 
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incremental learning very difficult as parameters once set need not stay set. In 
effect, having a finite set of questions to answer does not simplify the acquisition 
problem if the answers require a global evaluation of the data. Fodor suggests 
that an adequate answer will require reconsideration of evaluation metrics with 
all of the (apparent5) language particularities of the one in Aspects (Chomsky 
1965). The model she describes, however, has the virtue of being feasible in the 
sense that “neither online computation, nor memory is overtaxed” (p. 269).6  
 Back to the main thread: Chomsky’s historical reconstruction highlights 
two important points: First, the generative enterprise has been cumulative with 
results from prior periods of research conditioning later investigations. Second, 
with each epoch, the generative enterprise added a new question to the research 
agenda. This, of course, is exactly what one would expect from a successful 
program; break general questions down into a series of manageable bite size very 
specific research accessible topics, feed ensuing results into another set of related 
more ambitious research questions, then reiterate.  
 Though this is what one should expect, it is useful to rehearse this simple 
point at this time. Why? Because outsiders (and even some insiders) apparently 
look at the generative enterprise and see a blooming buzzing confusion moti-
vated by seemingly irrational changes in fashion, MP simply being the latest 
rage. The logic of the enterprise has clearly passed them by. A good remedy is a 
concise Whig history, and Chomsky provides one. Second, because under-
standing how linguistic theory has developed affects how we should now under-
stand the latest minimalist phase. For example, it modulates a widespread (if 
often inchoate) view that takes MP and GB to be competitors.7 Given the dis-
cussion above, they cannot be, at least in one sense (but see below), for the results 
specified by P&P (GB being P&P’s most auspicious incarnation) serve as the data 
to be analyzed by MP. As noted above, minimalist inquiry starts from the 
assumption that the “laws of grammar” as specified by GB are roughly empi-
rically correct. They correctly describe key features of linguistic competence, at 
least to a good first approximation. MP embraces this conclusion and adds the 
following item to the research agenda: Why these laws? Why do we find the 
locality principles we find (e.g., A-over-A, islands, binding domains, minimality, 
cyclicity)? Why are dependencies coded in chains with hierarchical requirements 
(e.g., the head is a case position, the tail a theta position, and the links locally c-
commanding one another)? Why are operations structure-dependent? Why are 
phrase markers hierarchically organized endocentrically? These and many other 
‘facts’ are the explanada. MP’s aim is to furnish an explanans. If so, MP will not 
                                                
    5 But see her discussion on pp. 269–270. 
    6 Dresher & Kaye (1987) is the first work to observe this problem with parameter-setting 
models. They propose a solution that requires a linguistically specific learning algorithm 
(one with specified paths through the parameter space; cf. Dresher 1999), in contrast to the 
general learning algorithms generally deployed. Their discussion involves stress learning 
and so it is not clear that their solution generalizes to the syntactic case. At any rate, it 
appears that there is now a general consensus that the P&P picture, though alluring, does 
not easily translate into a workable model of acquisition. 
    7 Following the approach of Hornstein et al. (2005), we will take GB to be the best worked out 
P&P theory, and we will tendentiously use it as proxy for the accepted wisdom. However, 
for what follows, the results of other frameworks would do just as well.  
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(and cannot) in general challenge these GB ‘facts’ (though they may modify them 
at the margins — recall that the assumption is that these are roughly empirically 
correct) but must assume them to be accurate. As corollary, MP cannot render ob-
solete GB-style research for there will always be value in discovering additional 
laws of grammar, new kinds of operations and generalizations. Rather, MP adds 
new questions to the research agenda; what principles (if any) do these generali-
zations follow from (e.g. economy, inclusiveness) and are these principles specific 
to linguistic computations (e.g. Merge) or are they reflections of more general 
principles of cognitive computation (e.g. No Tampering, Minimal Search)? In this 
sense, then, MP does not and cannot replace GB, any more than GB replaced the 
Standard Theory’s project of specifying the formal properties of linguistic con-
structions. In both cases, the results of the prior investigations were to a large 
extent conserved and served to set the scene for the next set of questions. Indeed, 
how could it have been otherwise! It is hard to factor out the common features of 
grammar rules without specifying any grammar rules and it is hard to ask what 
is specifically linguistic in a law of grammar without having any laws to con-
sider. 8  
 This said, there is a sense in which MP aims to replace GB. The MP proble-
matic has two parts. The first is that the generalizations that generative grammar 
has discovered over the last 50 years are roughly empirically accurate. The 
second is that the generalizations unearthed are not ontologically fundamental. 
The first assumption sets a target for the second: how to deduce the specific 
properties of the faculty of language described by the laws of GB from more 
fundamental principles of computation and cognition. If so, there is a sense in 
which MP and GB do conflict. What GB takes as constitutive of UG, MP takes as 
accurate description but ultimately derivative. Physicists have good terms for 
this. They distinguish ‘effective’ theories (which are empirically roughly right) 
from ‘fundamental’ theories, which limn the metaphysical basics. Given this dis-
tinction, we can say that though GB is an ‘effective’ theory, it is not fundamental.  
 Chomsky’s remarks in both the introduction and the conclusion make a 
second important point: Not only is the time ‘ripe’ for minimalist inquiries, given 
the discovery of plausible laws of grammar whose properties we can investigate, 
but logic dictates that the linguistic specificity and complexity of the GB con-
ception of UG must be illusory. Here’s the argument: Assume that complexity is 
the product of natural selection (NS), and assume that long time spans are 
required for natural selection to work its magic (say, on the order of many 
hundreds of thousands or millions of years). If so, UG’s properties cannot be the 
work of NS for there is reason to think that the human faculty of language is 
about 50–100,000 years old at most. Conclusion: The basic architecture of the 
Faculty of Language (FL) is not the result of an arduous and long process of 
selection but reflects an at most small addition to an already existing system of 
computations. This argues against the internal modularity of FL and against 
                                                
    8 A corollary: It cannot be a criticism of a proposed analysis that it is “not minimalist” because 
it invokes GB-style technology. In fact, if MP succeeds in reducing GB to a more basic theory 
(see below), then any decent GB analysis of a given phenomenon will have a smooth trans-
lation into a more fundamental minimalist account.  
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wildly idiosyncratic operations or principles of organization.9 The minimalist 
project aims to factor out those operations and principles that are part of cogni-
tive computation more generally and see what small bit has to be added to get 
what we in fact see. In effect, on this view, FL/UG is an interaction effect, the 
output of the interaction of one (or two) linguistically bespoke operation(s) in 
interaction with more general, cognitively extant principles of computation. 
 This animating general picture suggests at least two specific kinds of 
research projects. The first is reductive. If complexity bespeaks long periods of 
evolutionary time, then short time scales suggest simple organization. If so, the 
complex modular structure that P&P accounts like GB postulate for FL/UG must 
be illusory. In other words, an FL/UG with seven different modules, with many 
different grammatical operations, defined over different primitives, and invoking 
different domains of application must be illusory. The illusion is made manifest 
by reducing the different modules to a common set of operations and principles.  
 The earliest versions of MP (e.g. Chomsky 1993) initiated this line of in-
quiry by reducing case checking to movement theory, case checking being a 
special instance of A-movement (subject to minimality restrictions) to a dedicated 
case position. More (indeed, far more) controversial instances of the same logic 
have aimed to reduce control and anaphora to movement as well.10 Assuming 
Chomsky’s recent proposal that phrase structure-building and movement are 
special instances of the same basic operation — Merge (External and Internal 
Merge, respectively) — there is no fundamental distinction between movement 
and phrase structure construction either.  
 The logic mimics Chomsky’s reduction of Ross’s (1967) islands to a com-
mon set of operations (Move α), subject to a common set of conditions (Subja-
cency). If successful, this envisioned reduction significantly reduces the internal 
modularity of FL/UG. Case, control, binding, agreement, and movement are at 
bottom all the same kind of thing (viz. instances of Internal Merge), subject to the 
same restrictions and conditions in much the same way that topicalization, relati-
vization, question formation, and focus movement are all instances of A’-move-
ment, subject to Subjacency in Chomsky (1977). The best possible outcome is the 
elimination of all FL/UG-internal modules, and this possibility is clearly in sight 
theoretically. 
 The second project aims to build up the basic operations from computa-
tionally simple, well-behaved natural operations. Merge, which Chomsky has 
proposed is responsible both for phrase formation and displacement (aka move-
ment), is the minimalist operation of choice. If we assume that Merge is compu-
                                                
    9 This point has been put well in Fodor (1998: 12): 
 
If the mind is mostly a collection of innate modules, then […] it must 
have evolved gradually, under selection pressure. That’s because […] 
modules contain lots of specialised information about the problem-
domains that they compute in. 
 
Thus, a highly modular FL goes in tandem with an extended period within which NS oper-
ates. Conversely, a short period for NS to operate argues against a highly structured and 
modular FL. 
    10 See, among others, Lidz & Idsardi (1998), Hornstein (2001), Kayne (2002), Zwart (2002), 
Grohmann (2003), and Boeckx et al. (2010).  
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tationally well behaved (methodologically, the best assumption) we expect it to 
respect certain plausible conditions such as No Tampering and Inclusiveness. If 
we are clever (and lucky), we will discover that Merge, subject to its nice compu-
tational restrictions, will suffice to describe all the different kinds of dependen-
cies that are treated as separate in GB; in other words, we will discover that, once 
an operation like Merge arises, which is able to combine atomic elements to-
gether in a computationally simple and natural way, language-like systems will 
emerge, able to represent (all and only) dependencies of the kind described by 
GB-like versions of FL/UG. In other words, once phrase structure emerges, dis-
placement subject to the restrictions we find also arises. We are not at that point 
yet, but as Chomsky notes we are at least able to contemplate what such accounts 
might look like, and that is very exciting. 
 
2. Some Disputations 
 
This is the bare bones MP problematic. For the past two decades, Chomsky has 
offered a variety of different proposals to add meat to these bones. Some of these 
have proven to be controversial even among those moved by the animating 
picture. And this is how it should be! There are many ways to pursue the goals of 
the Minimalist Program. Inquiry will advance through the exploration of different 
specific minimalist theories — and over time, it is hoped, normal scientific practice 
will produce a fuller and fuller outline of the truth. Some provocative additions 
to the ongoing debate can be found in this volume. Let’s consider a couple. 
 There is decent evidence that phrases in natural language are endocentric. 
Minimalists have coded this fact by supposing that Merge is a complex operation 
that involves two sub-operations, one that unites two elements merged and one 
that labels the subsequently created object in terms of one of the two mergees. 
The element that provides the label is the head. This results in a phrase that is 
both complex and categorized as having the same type as its head. The properties 
of endocentricity, it is hoped, reflect (indeed, follow from) this labeling process. 
The natural question to ask is why natural languages have labeling? This volume 
provides two different answers. 
 Chomsky denies that labels are fundamental objects or that labeling is a 
basic grammatical operation. Rather, he suggests that labels/labeling reflect 
minimal search, a design feature of a well-behaved computational system. The 
idea is that a computational system that embodies minimal search will isolate one 
element of a combined pair (i.e. roughly a binary-branching phrase) as more 
accessible than the other. This element is the head. Or, as Chomsky says (p. 393): 
 
It’s close to true that Merge is always a head and another object (a head is 
just a lexical item, one of the atoms, so Merge is a lexical item and some 
other object). To the extent that this is true — and it is overwhelmingly true 
— you eliminate the last residue of phrase structure grammar (projections or 
labels) because the head is just the thing that you find by minimal search. 
 
On this view of things, (i) endocentricity is a product of minimal search and (ii) 
mini-mal search suffices to capture “everything about headedness”. Given (i) and 
(ii), we can reasonably conclude that (iii) endocentricity is a defining property of 
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well-designed computational systems and (iv) we should expect to find that most 
natural (and artificial?) computational systems exploit endocentric structures. 
 Cedric Boeckx presents a different view in chapter 3.11 He proposes that the 
process of labeling a complex via one of its constituents is an operation unique to 
language and one of its basic defining properties.12 As he says (pp. 47–48): 
 
[T]his [labeling — AD & NH], as far as I can tell, is very, very specific to 
language as a kind of hierarchical structure. If you look elsewhere in other 
systems of cognition […] you find a lot of evidence for hierarchical struc-
turing of systems, possibly recursive ones, but as far as I can tell, these hier-
archical structures are not headed or endocentric […]. That […] is very spe-
cific to language, so while you find hierarchies everywhere, headed or endo-
centric hierarchies seem very central to language. 
 
On this view, whereas a “grouping procedure that puts X and Y together” is 
likely to be very common across cognitive modules, the operation of “selecting 
one of these two members and basically using that member as the next unit for 
recombination” (p. 48) is unique to language. Thus, we do not expect it to be part 
of computational systems in general but to arise predominantly (perhaps, 
exclusively) in linguistic structures.  
 We are partial to the second view of labels for several reasons: First, 
Boeckx’s observation that we do not find endocentric structures in other areas of 
cognition argues against analyzing it as a product of minimal search for were this 
its source such structures should be ubiquitous features of any moderately well 
designed computational system, apparently contrary to fact.13 Second, it is not 
clear to us how minimal search suffices to derive the properties associated with 
endocentricity. Take, for example, head-to-head selection or subcategorization, 
e.g. the relation between interest and in in phrases like interest in Bill. This relation 
is severely restricted. Nouns might select/subcategorize for the prepositional 
head in a PP complement, e.g. interest requires in, but there is never selection for 
the complement of the prepositional head. Thus, there are no nouns like interest 
that require that the nominal complement be fish (or a DP headed by the) but 
allow for any preposition whatsoever, e.g. *interest (over/under/to/with) fish. Why 
not? Because only the head within a phrase can be seen by an outside head. And 
this is not because the preposition is less complex than its complement for make 
the complement of in as simple as possible, e.g. it, and the complement will still 
                                                
    11 The reader should be warned that one author is a partisan here, as this view is also pro-
posed and defended in Hornstein (2009). 
    12 Hornstein (2009) proposes that it is the adventitious addition which, when added to the rest 
of cognition, results in a grammatical distillate. 
    13 It is not easy to find examples of artificial computational systems that code endocentricity. 
Basic arithmetic seems to do well without it, for example. Programming languages also tend 
to avoid endocentric means of combination (though here there is more room for interpre-
tation). In both cases, the most common (and in arithmetic, only) form of combination is 
homogenous: Multiple expressions of the same kind combine to form another expression of 
that kind. For example, the integer expressions 2, –2, and 3 combine to form the expression 
[2 * [–2 + 3]], or a sequence of statements combines to form a single complex statement. In 
the case of programming languages, one also finds clear examples of non-homogenous but 
nonetheless non-endocentric combination. For example, a list of variable and method decla-
rations combines to form a class (which itself is neither a variable nor method declaration). 
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never be visible to an outside selecting head. This suggests that minimal search is 
besides the point for, hierarchically speaking, the preposition and its simplex 
complement are equidistant from any higher element.14 As such, searching for 
either should be equally ‘minimal’. Third, labels make computational sense when 
one considers the fine structure of Merge. Labeling closes the ‘combine’ operation 
in the domain of the lexical atoms. As Chomsky (2008) has noted, mergeable 
items must have edge features. All lexical atoms have these inherently. Further-
more, when two atoms combine to form a unit, that unit must also have an edge 
feature for it is further combinable. Whence this edge feature? It cannot be a lexi-
cal property as complex units are not primitive atoms. Thus, it must inherit this 
property, presumably from the elements combined. In other words, even if we 
define Merge as the operation that combines lexical atoms, we need to explain 
how this combinatorial power extends to lexical complexes. Given standard 
assumptions, it is natural to think that labels endow complexes with the powers 
of atoms: A lexical atom inherently has an edge feature and a phrase inherits an 
edge feature insofar as it shares the properties of its head.15 In other words, edge 
feature inheritance supervenes on labels as labeling is what allows complex units 
to combine in just the way that simplex lexical atoms do. In effect, labels create an 
equivalence class of expressions centered on primitive lexical atoms. This is the 
secret to the kind of hierarchical combination natural languages exploit. 
 There is, no doubt, more to say on either side of this ‘debate’. However, 
what is important here is the recognition that neither proposal is a priori more or 
less ‘minimalist’; both fit the spirit of the program. Which is correct is (ultimately) 
an empirical matter, not an ideological one. The Minimalist Program is compa-
tible with various minimalist theories, and which versions should prevail is an 
empirical (albeit, no doubt, complex) matter. 
 Luigi Rizzi’s discussion of two notions of locality (chapter 11) offers a 
second illustration of a nice, ripe minimalist research question. Movement is cur-
rently subject to what appears to be two different locality restrictions, Relativized 
Minimality (RM) and Phase Impenetrability (PI). The former forbids dependen-
cies between two elements X and Y over an intervening Z of the same type, with 
type being defined featurally. The latter prevents dependencies that span the 
complement domains of specific elements, v and C being (at least) two. Both 
notions are part of the current minimalist technical apparatus and both have 
empirical virtues. Rizzi asks the obvious minimalist question: Do we really need 
both?16 More specifically, given that locality is a way of bounding domains of 
computation and given that bounded computations are invariably efficient and 
                                                
    14 Note that endocentric labels will help define minimal dependencies and heads will be more 
prominent than anything else in a phrase. However, this reverses the explanation: Minimal 
search supervenes on headedness, not the other way around. 
    15 This follows from what a label is. For example, it is the standard assumption that the label is 
the head (cf. Chomsky 1995). Moreover, in virtue of this, X’-theory assumes that “a head and 
its projections share all [our emphasis — AD & NH] properties apart from bar-level […]” 
(Chomsky 1986: 18). Thus, if a head has an edge feature, the phrase that it labels does too. 
This suffices to project edge features in the required way: A phrase inherits an edge feature 
from one of its daughters and the daughter it inherits it from is the head.  
    16 Our impression from the dearth of discussion of minimality in Chomsky’s latest papers is 
that he too is attracted to the idea that there is only one operative locality condition, viz. PI. 
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well behaved, we expect on conceptual grounds that linguistic computations 
should be bounded and local. However, bounding the computations twice over 
via two different locality conditions does not obviously make computations more 
well-behaved or more efficient. So, why two?  
 The question becomes more insistent when one notes that current versions 
of RM and PI are somewhat redundant. So, for example, each only kicks in when 
two or more expressions of the same type are lurking and neither applies to put 
an absolute bound on a grammatical domain. Here’s what we mean. Consider a 
case of multiple movement as in (1): 
 
(1) John1 seems to be believed to be likely to be kissed t1. 
 
There is a long-distance relation (potentially unbounded) between John and its 
base position indicated by t1. RM places no bound on this dependency as there is 
no relevant intervening element, i.e. no other DP in this domain. PI, at least 
Chomsky’s version, treats (1) as a single phase.17 So, both RM and PI countenance 
arbitrarily long distance dependencies in similar circumstances. Moreover, both 
block them in similar cases. So for example, in (2) both RM and PI block move-
ment of the object to the higher subject position: 
 
(2)    * John1 seems that it was told t1 that Bill left. 
 
For RM, it intervenes between John and its base position and with PI the comple-
ment of that is a phase and hence its complement is impermeable. This suggests 
that in different ways, the two conditions apply to the same configurations and 
hence are partly redundant. This only strengthens the above-mooted why-
question: why these two locality restrictions?18  
 One of the more interesting arguments for PI comes from successive cyclic 
movement. Indeed, the derivation of successive cyclicity from Subjacency was 
one of its more endearing properties. There is evidence that in examples like (3) 
we have moved C-to-C: 
 
(3) How1 did you think [CP t’1 that we will solve Plato’s Problem t1]? 
 
Note that if C is a strong phase, then PI requires movement of how via the phase 
edge. This results in successive cyclic movement. It is less clear how to accom-
modate these data given RM. Rizzi proposes a solution. In effect, he postulates 
features in finite C (Q-features) that via RM will prevent wh-operators like how 
from traversing them. He further provides empirical evidence from Chamorro 
for the selective nature of this restriction, some wh’s able to cross the finite C — 
others not. 
                                                
    17 This is not quite right, there is no strong phase between John and t. There are several weak 
phases, but as these fail to block grammatical intercourse, they do not bound computations. 
    18 That RM and PI should roughly overlap is suggested by the fact that, on both, transitive 
clauses are expected to be local domains for A-movement. This is true for RM because at 
least two DPs live in a transitive clause and hence one should block movement of the other. 
In PI this is because transitive v is strong. We will see momentarily that there are ways of 
endowing finite C, which is a strong phase head within PI, with features that block non-
local dependencies across them in an RM-approach.  
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 The discussion is subtle and interesting, albeit more suggestive than 
conclusive.19 The paper is too cursory to settle the question of whether all un-
bounded dependencies can be regulated using just RM.20 For example, the dis-
cussion is limited to weak island effects and the classical cases of locality are 
those involving strong islands.21 However, the question is a very good one and 
the kinds of considerations that Rizzi brings to bear in the discussion well illus-
trate the empirical utility of raising such minimalist concerns. 
 Tom Bever (chapter 18) offers a third example in his discussion of the EPP, 
the requirement that sentences have subjects. This principle has resisted attempts 
at rationalization or deeper explanation, and it stands to date as a theoretical dia-
critic enforcing the requirement that sentences have subjects. Bever’s paper pro-
poses to remove the EPP from FL/UG and instead locate it in learning theory. It 
is an expression of the Canonical Form Constraint (CFC), which requires that 
“sentences […] must sound like they are sentences of the language to afford the 
individual child a statistical entrée into acquiring it” (p. 279). If correct, this 
serves the minimalist ambition of tidying up FL/UG by repositioning a require-
ment that is an ad hoc idiosyncrasy when understood grammatically to a prin-
cipled effect when understood as part of a more general theory of learning. 
 The ambition and form of the argument Bever presents is impeccable. Less 
clear is whether it covers all the relevant cases. The chapter concentrates on cases 
of the CFC and the EPP in main clauses. The discussion ranges over expletive 
constructions and passives and one can see how the CFC could be deployed to 
account for the presence of expletive subjects and movement of objects under 
passivization. As Bever notes, “the vast majority of sentences and clauses have a 
canonical form with a subject preceding a correspondingly inflected verb” (p. 
289). Expletives serve to gather sentences that have no apparent logical subjects 
under the same statistical rubric, as would moving objects to subject position in 
cases like passive, where subjects are left unexpressed, or unaccusatives, where 
there are no subject-like arguments to be had. This all fits nicely together, especi-
ally in finite matrix domains. Note, however, that in these domains, there are also 
plausible and natural grammatical candidates to explain the EPP, for example, 
the Inverse Case Filter; the requirement that there be lexical expressions able to 
support the (nominative) case that finite T0 assigns to their specifiers. Here, no 
“conspiracy” (p. 290) of interacting constraints is required, only the natural 
assumption that morphological case needs to be assigned, and thus something 
needs to be there to receive it.22 The real testing ground for the EPP is non-finite 
                                                
    19 In addition, there exists some evidence that arguments like who/what trigger inversion in 
languages like French and Spanish but adjuncts like why/how do not. This might at first 
blush be taken to indicate that only who/what undergo successive-cyclic movement. This 
raises non-trivial variation issues if correct, since in the work Rizzi cites, Chung (1994: 29) 
has argued that both adjuncts and arguments trigger wh-agreement in Chamorro. 
    20 This is not a criticism of the paper, given the venue in which it was presented. We are sure 
that Rizzi would agree that the argument he provides was intended to be illustrative (and in 
this it succeeds admirably) rather than definitive. 
    21 It is not clear that the approach of adding features to heads can be applied to yield strong 
island effects. Then again, extending PI to accommodate strong islands seems to require 
adding D to the inventory of phases, and this sits poorly with Chomsky’s interest in tying 
the inventory of phases to propositional heads.  
    22 Note that we are not saying that this is the correct explanation. Rather, we are observing 
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embedded clauses; do these also require subjects? A case-based account would 
answer in the negative, as would, we surmise, an account based on the CFC.  
 At present, there is not overwhelming evidence that non-finite clauses re-
quire subjects.23 However, this is where the consequences of the EPP are the most 
interesting and least obviously tied to what one finds in matrix clauses. This said, 
Bever’s proposal is interesting for it provides a picture of how one might try to 
give a non-grammatical account of what would appear to be a paradigmatic 
example of a grammatical restriction. This is the sort of thing that minimalists 
should welcome for simplifying UG it makes it easier to explain its remaining 
properties. 
 All three discussions illustrate another important point. The take-home 
message from San Sebastian is that it takes a lot of work to show how linguistic 
competence relates to cognition in general. Serious illumination requires identi-
fying specific linguistic features (e.g., endocentricity, selective islands, EPP), 
isolating some plausibly general cognitive operations or computational restric-
tions and showing how the former follow from the latter. The examples above 
attempt this. If they succeed then we have managed to isolate the cognitively/ 
computationally general from the linguistically specific. Unless we do this, what 
we have is the sound of one hand waving. 
 
3. Words and Concepts 
 
Chomsky’s introduction touches on a second very important feature of linguistic 
systems. In addition to the unique kind of recursion we find in language, human 
linguistic systems contain atoms, lexical items (words) that exhibit a distinctive 
(perhaps unique) set of properties. They are remarkably flexible things, at least 
when compared with what we find in other biological communication systems. 
As Chomsky (p. 27) notes: 
 
The basic problem is that even the simplest words and concepts of human 
language and thought lack the relation to mind-independent entities that 
has been reported for animal communication: representational systems 
based on a one-one relation between mind/brain processes and “an aspect 
of the environment to which these processes adapt the animal’s behavior,” 
to quote Randy Gallistel [Gallistel 1990]. The symbols of human language 
are sharply different. […] Communication relies on shared cognoscitive 
                                                                                                                                 
that this is a natural grammar-internal explanation, that it is not theoretically idiosyncratic, 
and that it serves to remove the diacritical nature of the EPP. This kind of proposal exists in 
the literature, cf. Castillo et al. (1999) and Epstein & Seely (2006). 
    23 In our opinion the best argument concerns cases like (i): 
 
  (i)  Johni appears to Maryk to seem to *herselfk/himselfi to be intelligent.  
 The unacceptability of herself and the acceptability of himself follows if there is a trace of John 
in the subject of the first embedded clause, which in turn follows if the EPP holds in all 
clauses, including non-finite ones. The main problem with such examples concerns the 
relative poor status of (ii). It should be perfect given the unacceptability of (i) with Mary 
anteceding herself, given that pronouns are licensed by the binding theory precisely where 
reflexives are barred. To our ears, (ii) is not particularly good. This renders the datum in (i) 
hard to interpret. 
 
  (ii)  Johni appears to Maryk to seem to her??k to be intelligent. 
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powers, and succeeds insofar as shared mental constructs, background, 
concerns, presuppositions, etc. allow for common perspectives to be (more 
or less) attained. These semantic properties of lexical items seem to be 
unique to human language and thought, and have to be accounted for some-
how in the study of their evolution. 
 
It is not at all clear what the cognitive basis of these distinctive features of words 
is. It is not even clear whether this is a specifically linguistic property of words or 
a more general cognitive feature of human concepts. It appears, however, that 
this is a unique characteristic of human words/concepts and is key to any future 
understanding of the creative aspects of language use. To date, we lack a 
systematic description of the basic semantic properties of words/concepts or a 
systematic comparison between human words/concepts and those found in 
other animals.  
 An interesting line of current inquiry prompted by recent minimalist 
concerns compares animal and human cognition to isolate those features that are 
specifically ‘human’.24 Marc Hauser’s contributions (chapters 5 and 19) directly 
advance this project, as does Randy Gallistel’s, albeit more indirectly. Animal 
cognition is very elaborate. Gallistel’s paper (chapter 4) describes the elaborate 
“foundational abstractions of time, space, number and intentionality [that] 
inform the behavior of birds and bees (p. 61)”. It appears that birds can reason 
about time: They “compute elapsed intervals and compare them to other inter-
vals in memory (p. 63)”. They can reason about number: They are able to “first 
subtract the current number from a target number in memory and then compare 
the result to another target number in memory (p. 63)”. And they can evaluate 
“the likely intentions of others and reason from their own actions to the likely 
future actions of others (p. 64)”. All of this requires rather formidable compu-
tational powers as well as primitive foundational (innate) abstractions concerning 
time, number and other minds of a robust sort. Interestingly, these elaborate 
capacities appear to exist independently of a facility for language and so we can 
conclude that linguistic capacity is not necessary for a rich mental life (see the 
discussion of Gelman’s chapter below). 
 In chapter 5, Hauser pursues this comparative methodology to consider 
concepts that are characteristic features of linguistic systems. He reports work 
indicating that rhesus monkeys distinguish singular from plural concepts as well 
as mass from count. If this is correct, then despite the grammatical exploitation of 
these notions, their etiology is independent of FL. This does not imply that the 
concepts operative grammatically are in every way identical to those that 
Hauser’s monkeys have. He points out that infants do less well than rhesus 
monkeys when forced to enumerate objects versus masses (p. 81). Thus, even if 
the count/mass distinction does not require linguistic underpinnings, it may well 
be that absorption into FL endows the distinction with distinctive properties. 
Nonetheless, these results support an important minimalist intuition; that 
language is a very complex system and that linguistic competence is an inter-
action effect with various non-linguistic parts of our cognitive apparatus making 
                                                
    24 See the distinction between the broad and narrow faculty of language in Hauser et al. (2002), 
where the minimalist sources of this kind of research is clearly outlined. 




 If concepts do indeed predate language, we might ask what else was 
present in the pre-linguistic conceptual-intentional (C-I) systems. This question is 
raised by Wolfram Hinzen in a provocative chapter 9, which argues for the 
abolition of the C-I interface. Chomsky believes that the structures derived in the 
syntactic component are fed into a set of highly intricate interpretative processes; 
let us term this the ‘interpretavist’ position. These interpretative processes are 
standardly taken to fix certain aspects of, for example, scopal and anaphoric 
interpretation. As such, they must have logical as well as conceptual resources at 
their disposal. In particular, they must be able to ‘read’ the recursive hierarchical 
structures offered up by the syntax. This, Hinzen argues, is a fatal flaw in 
Chomsky’s conception of the relation between the syntax and the C-I interface. 
Chomsky has famously claimed that recursion is a, or perhaps even the, property 
specific to language.25 But, of course, this is not a coherent position if his con-
ception of the C-I interface presupposes recursion in other cognitive faculties. 
 There are various technical moves that could be made at this point in 
defense of the interpretavist position. For example, it may be that Hinzen is infer-
ring too much from the fact that the C-I interfaces are able to read the recursive 
structures generated by the syntax. This does not necessarily imply that 
“recursive thought” was possible prior to the development of language. Rather, it 
may be that the capacity to interpret recursive structures lay dormant until the 
corresponding ability to generate them developed. In any case, we will not 
quibble further on these points, since we think that Hinzen has hit on a genuine 
puzzle. Our main concern is with Hinzen’s sketch of a solution to this puzzle, 
which we find problematic. 
 Hinzen’s approach is in the tradition of ‘abstract syntax’. On the interpre-
tavist model, as developed within the Minimalist Program, syntactic processes 
are for the most part semantically blind. Some syntactic units may receive no 
interpretation at all (e.g. dummy prepositions such as of), and the same syntactic 
configuration may admit of multiple interpretations. In contrast, Hinzen argues 
that syntactic structures are inherently meaningful. They do not receive interpre-
tations; they bear meanings. 
 We see two primary difficulties with Hinzen’s approach. The first problem 
is one that his approach has in common with its historical antecedents. There is a 
multitude of gnarly technical difficulties involved in attempting to capture 
semantic generalizations in syntactic terms. Consider, for example, judgments of 
entailment and synonymy. Some of these might plausibly be read off syntactic 
structure directly (e.g., that if John met Bill on Tuesday, he met Bill). Others can 
be farmed out the conceptual component (e.g., that if John ate breakfast, he ate 
some food). There remain, however, awkward intermediate cases. For example, 
though competent English speakers know that (4a) is near-synonymous with (4b) 
the contrast between (5a) and (5b) suggests (ingenious arguments to the contrary 
notwithstanding26) that this relationship cannot be captured in syntactic terms: 
 
                                                
    25 Or to be more precise, a/the property specific to the faculty of language in the narrow sense 
(Hauser et al. 2002). 
    26 See Jackendoff (1969: chap. 5) and references cited therein for relevant discussion. 
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(4) a. John rarely makes mistakes. 
 b. It is rare for John to make mistakes. 
 
(5) a. John deliberately makes mistakes. 
 b.     * It is deliberate for John to make mistakes. 
 
Attempts to give syntactic analyses for phenomena of this sort have inevitably 
led to the postulation of highly complex and abstract syntactic structures. Com-
plex and idiosyncratic rules are then required to ensure that, for example, (4b) 
can surface as (4a), but that (5b) cannot surface as (5a). 
 This brings us to the second difficulty, which unlike the first is proprietary 
to minimalism. Suppose that the abstract syntax project is one day executed 
successfully. (The technical difficulties may, after all, be overcome.) Could the 
resulting theory be in any sense minimalist? A virtue of the interpretativist ap-
proach is that it permits us to separate out a small domain — a relatively modest 
syntactic component — in which a reductionist approach is feasible. On almost 
anybody’s account, the interpretative systems are far less tractable. A cautiously 
optimistic person might hope to see the basic properties of A-movement derived 
from “minimal search” in his or her lifetime. But it seems fantastic to suppose 
that the whole semantic circus will submit to this sort of treatment. In our view, 
then, minimalism is quite fatal to any attempt to break down the barrier between 
syntax and the C-I system — or to put it in less guarded terms, between language 
and thought. Whatever may be the correct division of labor between mental 
faculties, we suspect that the bit that does the merging and moving will turn out 
to be a lot smaller than the bit that does the thinking. 
 Chomsky’s remarks (especially in the conclusion) touch on his own views 
regarding the relation of language, meaning and thought in general. He briefly 
mentions classical conundra, such as the ship of Theseus, and Kripke’s (1979) 
puzzle regarding the meaning of belief-ascribing sentences. What he does not 
belabor here, but has explicitly noted elsewhere, is that more often than not, 
natural language runs roughshod over classical semantic distinctions; temperat-
ures can be 90 and rising, books that weigh five pounds can be engrossing, the 
average man can have 5.4 children, hexagonal European states can be republics, 
London, a city of 5 million, can burn down and be rebuilt three miles down the 
Thames, there can be flaws in arguments, etc. These constructions seem to 
conflate values and functions, refer to impossible entities, run-together geo-
graphical and constitutional conceptions, treat abstract and concrete dimensions 
on a par etc. All of this should discourage the jump from linguistic or conceptual 
analysis to metaphysics, since, “if you give a metaphysical interpretation to these 
things, you run right off into impossible conundrums” (p. 382). If we are interest-
ed in what is really distinctive about human language, it behooves us to find out 
just how labile our words/concepts are.27  
 Several other papers in the volume directly speak to this enterprise. For 
example, Rochel Gelman (chapter 15) distinguishes between core and non-core 
domains of knowledge. The former consist of “skeletal” innate mental structures 
                                                
    27 Paul Pietroski has recently emphasized this (cf. Pietroski 2010). 
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that “direct attention and permit the uptake of relevant data in the environment” 
(p. 226). Such a skeleton seeds the acquisition process by providing “a set of 
coherent principles that form a structure and contains unique entities that are 
domain specific” (p. 226). Gelman provides a concise description of the proper-
ties of core domains (pp. 228–229), which should look familiar to readers of this 
journal as it well describes how linguists have been thinking of principles of UG 
for the last 50 years, as Chomsky notes (p. 384). Gelman also provides an illus-
tration for the domain of natural number and isolates three principles that seed 
the counting process (p. 231). It would be interesting to consider how these 
specific principles may or may not be related to those that undergird linguistic 
knowledge, especially given speculations that “the numbering system is just a 
trivial case of language” (p. 33) and the apparent fact noted in Gallistel’s chapter 
that birds are pretty good arithmeticians.28 
 Lila Gleitman (chapter 16) offers a second illustration, closer to home. She 
has long observed how hard word learning actually is, in part because of the 
“richness of the stimulus” (p. 210). The hard problem, she persuasively 
demonstrates, is to understand how the infant is able to “represent […] context 
‘in the right way’” (p. 207). How do children know to ignore some features of a 
scene as irrelevant to lexical meaning in some contexts while attending to them 
correctly in others? She illustrates the problem by reviewing some experiments 
by Gordon (2003) on 10-month-olds (who as yet utter no words) in which a 
stuffed bear passed between two participants is gauged relevant in scenes depict-
ing givings but not huggings. This suggests that the capacity to index partici-
pants to event types is ‘epistemologically prior’ to word learning and serves as a 
boost to that process. Similarly, later on the richness of the stimulus is similarly 
tamed by considering how discourse and thematic roles are mapped into syn-
tactic frames and how these can be used to constrain mappings to meaning. For 
example, it appears that both adults and children use an interlocutor’s eye gaze 
to pick out the subject of a sentence and this in turn helps to disentangle fleeings 
from chasings (p. 245). Mapping words to concepts is a very complex affair in 
which “a mosaic of conspiring cues […] are exploited […] to converge almost 
errorlessly on the lexicon of the native tongue” (p. 211). Not surprisingly, these 
cues appear culled from various parts of our cognitive apparatus and interact 
with the specifically linguistic properties of FL/UG in very complex ways. 
 
4. There Is Much More 
 
There are many more interesting papers in this volume that we do not have the 
competence or space to discuss in detail. All of these are summarized in the 
useful and detailed introduction by Massimo Piattelli-Palmarini, Pello Salaburu 
and Juan Uriagereka. In chapter 6, Gabriel Dover argues strongly against the 
idea the “laws of form” significantly constrain biological variation, and makes 
some speculations regarding free will.29 Donata Vercelli and Massimo Piattelli-
                                                
    28 See the very brief discussion between Gelman and Higginbotham on p. 236 as well. 
    29 With regard to free will, we are not persuaded that Dover really addresses the problem at 
all. Dover’s focus is on the first-person subjective problem of free will. He suggests that free 
will is “a situation of rapidly and subtly changing outcomes as degenerate neuronal net-
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Palmarini (chapter 7) give a useful introduction to epigenetics (the study of 
heritable changes which are not caused by changes in DNA), and discuss with 
Dover its implications for the biology of language. Christopher Cherniak 
outlines the case for “non-genomic nativism” with regard to the optimization of 
neural connections (chapter 8). James Higginbotham makes a case for a robustly 
truth-conditional approach to semantics, and presents a brief analysis of typo-
logical variation in the availability of resultative constructions (chapter 10). Juan 
Uriagereka discusses the problems posed by uninterpretable Case features, and a 
possible solution in terms of the “viral” theory of Case (chapter 12). Angela Frie-
derici presents fMRI data suggesting that different regions of the brain are res-
ponsible for processing local dependencies vs. hierarchical structures (chapters 13 
and 22). Chapter 14 contains a fascinating round table discussion with Cedric 
Boeckx, Janet Dean Fodor, Lila Gleitman, and Luigi Rizzi on “Language Uni-
versals: Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow”. Itziar Laka clarifies certain questions 
regarding the domain-specificity of UG principles (chapter 20). Núria Sebastián-
Gallés discusses neuro-imaging studies which shed light on the question of why 
there is so much variation in the extent to which second language acquisition is 
successful (chapter 21).  
 It is fashionable nowadays to lament the current state of generative 
grammar in general, and minimalist syntax in particular. This volume serves as 
an excellent antidote. In fact, it is a pretty good advertisement, in our view, for 
the intellectual vitality of the current enterprise. Minimalism has added a new set 
of questions to the research agenda, both within syntax proper and in the neigh-
boring domains of psychology, neuroscience, and biology. Some of these links 
are more tenuous than others, as we should expect. Nonetheless, it is clear, at 
least to us, that research on the structure of FL is thriving, and that this is partly 
due to the fecundity of the core ideas of the Minimalist Program. From where we 
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works switch from one quasi-stable state of topology to others […]. At the level of biology 
[…] there is an unbroken route of cause and effect […] but at the level of our sense of what 
happened, we feel that at the threshold of the final step […] is one for us alone to decide”. 
Leaving aside the decorative references to degenerate neural networks, this is just a 
statement of the standard determinist position, i.e. that for any given pair of a pre-decision 
state S1 and post-decision state S2, S1 lawfully and deterministically brings about S2, even 
though we (erroneously) believe that S2 is contingent both on S1 and some additional act of 
volition. It remains unclear on Dover’s account why we feel as if we’re making free 
decisions. (Why don’t we just feel as if we’re switching between quasi-stable states?) 
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